The controller area network (CAN) is the most widely used in-vehicle network to communicate among electronic control units. However, the CAN does not provide security functionalities, such as encryption or message authentication. Attackers can analyze CAN logs and inject valid messages based on the analysis to cause malfunctions. Thus, security functions appropriate to the CAN environment are required to prevent attacks. In this paper, we propose a dynamic identifier (ID) virtualization method that prevents CAN logs from being analyzed and makes it difficult for attackers to generate valid messages. We implement a virtualization module to perform dynamic ID virtualization and measure the delay and computational overhead caused by the proposed method. Additionally, we demonstrate the security of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN vehicles comprise dozens of electronic control units (ECUs). Each ECU controls specific functions of a vehicle and sends/receives information by several communication technologies. Many in-vehicle communication technologies (e.g., multimedia oriented systems transport, local interconnect network, FlexRay, and controller area network (CAN)) have been developed to efficient communication among ECUs. Among those, the CAN is the most suitable for communicating information related to the vehicle operation because of the robustness and the low delay. However, the CAN has several vulnerabilities (e.g., using the fixed identifier (ID) and the absence of security functions). Additionally, vehicles of the same type use a same CAN database file [1] . The CAN database file demonstrates information about transmitted messages to the CAN bus. The information includes IDs transmitted to the CAN bus, the transmission period of messages, the encoding method of data fields, physical data types including messages, and the position of the physical data at a data field. Attackers can easily analyze CAN logs and use the analyzed information on different vehicles of the same type. Marchetti and Stabili [2] classified these collected CAN logs by ID and analyzed data fields The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ricardo De Castro. automatically using bit-flip rate. Therefore, they classified the data field into physical data, counter, and cyclic redundancy check (CRC). Verma et al. [3] obtained detailed information about the CAN database file of a vehicle by analyzing the relationship between CAN messages and vehicle diagnostic messages. Therefore, they analyzed physical data types represented to data fields and the encoding method applied to data fields. Based on the CAN database file created from analyzing CAN logs, attackers can generate valid messages and inject them into the CAN bus, causing malfunctions in the vehicle systems. Koscher et al. [4] generated valid messages via the fuzzing method and injected the messages into a vehicle to cause malfunctions, such as disabling brakes. Miller and Valasek [5] generated the CAN database file in advance, accessed a vehicle's CAN bus via wireless communications, and injected malicious messages resulting in malfunctions. Woo et al. [6] injected valid messages in the vehicle via the driver's mobile phone, causing malfunction. Because various analysis methods for CAN logs and valid message injection attacks are available, security countermeasures are required in the CAN environment.
Many studies proposed methods to prevent message injection attacks. However, most of them were unsuitable for the vehicle environment because of the need for additional messages and a large transmission delay [6] - [8] . In this paper, we propose dynamic ID virtualization method, suitable VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ for the CAN environment because of the small transmission delay and the needlessness of additional messages. The dynamic ID virtualization prevents attackers from performing CAN logs analysis by changing IDs randomly when sending messages. Since attackers cannot know valid IDs of the next transmission, the proposed method makes valid message injection attacks difficult. We implement a virtualization module for dynamic ID virtualization and conduct experiments on various cases to evaluate the performance and security of the proposed method. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. 1) We propose dynamic ID virtualization method that does not change message priority by allocating ranges randomly for each ID and virtualizes the ID within the ranges.
2) The proposed method renders the analysis of the CAN log meaningless and imposes time constraints on attackers performing the reverse engineering. 3) We propose random number sharing method in CAN environment and analyze the security of the proposed method.
4) We implement a virtualization module that virtualizes
IDs between the original software and the CAN bus. 5) We evaluate the delay and computational overhead by experiment. Additionally, we analyze the security of the proposed method against existing valid message injection attacks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background knowledge of the CAN. In Section 3, we describe the existing research related to the ID changing method in the CAN. Section 4 explains the attack model. Section 5 explains the system model of dynamic ID virtualization. In Section 6, we describe the implementation environment. In Section 7, we analyze the proposed method. Section 8 discusses the feasibility of the other reverse engineering methods. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND

A. CAN
The CAN was developed by Bosch in 1983, was standardized as ISO-11898 in 1993, and is now the most widely used in-vehicle network [21] .
1) CAN DATA FRAME
For actual message transmission/reception among ECUs, a data frame, as shown in Fig. 1 , is transmitted via the CAN bus. The data frame comprises a total of 12 fields. Those related to this paper include an ID and a data field. The ID comprises 11 bits (29 bits in extended mode) and is used to identify the message. Thus, IDs are pre-determined according to transmitted messages. Additionally, the ID is used to prioritize message transmission. Messages with a low ID have high transmission priority. The data field is used to indicate information about the message and comprises 0 to 8-bytes.
2) CAN BUS ARBITRATION
When two or more nodes try to transmit messages at the same time, the CAN bus uses an arbitration method. The arbitration uses a dominant bit (0) and a recessive bit (1) . As shown in Fig. 2 , when two nodes send different bits to the CAN bus at the same time, the dominant bit is sent to the CAN bus. If the bit transmitted by the two nodes differs when the ID of the message is being transmitted, the node transmitted the recessive bit recognizes that other messages is being transmitted to the CAN bus and stops transmitting its message. 
3) CAN ERROR TYPES
Error types directly related to this paper include the bit and stuff error. In areas other than the ID, the sender-side node recognizes the bit error when another bit different from a bit transmitted by the node is transmitted to the CAN bus. Because nodes does not transmit the same bit more than six times consecutively in CAN environment, owing to time synchronization, the receiver-side nodes recognize the stuff error when the node receives the same bit six consecutive times.
4) CAN ERROR HANDLING
Each node in the CAN has a transmit error counter (TEC) and a receive error counter (REC) for error handling. If a sender-side node detects an error, the node stops sending its message, increases the TEC by 8, and sends an error frame to the CAN bus. If a receiver-side node detects an error, the node increases the REC by 1 and sends an error frame to the CAN bus. When the node succeeds transmission/reception of a message, the node decreases the TEC/REC by 1 up to 0. Depending on the TEC and the REC, the node becomes one of the three states as shown in Fig. 3 . If the node is an error active mode, it transmits six consecutive dominant bits (000000) as an error frame. If the node is an error passive mode, it transmits six consecutive recessive bits (111111) as an error frame. When the node is a bus off mode, the node cannot transmit messages. 
III. RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we describe the existing ID changing methods.
IA-CAN: Han et al. [9] proposed a method that anonymized fixed IDs to authenticate senders. In IA-CAN, the ID was divided into two parts. The upper bit part was used for priority identification. The lower bit part was used for authentication of the sender via anonymization. Since the upper bits were fixed for priority identification, IA-CAN was vulnerable to attackers analyzing CAN logs. Additionally, at the session initiation stage, attackers could re-transmit a random number of the previous session initiation stage to render the session as same as the previous session.
ID obfuscation: Lukasiewycz et al. [10] proposed an ID obfuscation method to make a different CAN database file for each vehicle by changing priorities and IDs. Since the IDs is fixed, the proposed method does not provide additional security about a single vehicle when compared to the conventional CAN environment.
ID hopping: Humayed and Luo [11] proposed an ID hopping method to prevent target DoS attack. When the attack was detected, the proposed method changed IDs by adding an offset to original IDs. Since original IDs hopped once when nodes switched to the ID hopping mode, attackers could easily deduce the offset by analyzing alternative IDs.
CANORa: Madl et al. [12] proposed two ID obfuscation method using a seed. The first method was the obfuscation of IDs through the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The second method was the obfuscation of IDs each time a vehicle stopped. Even with the proposed high security method, messages were transmitted with fixed IDs while driving. Additionally, even if IDs were re-obfuscated when the vehicle stopped, attackers can easily match the changed ID to the previous ID using priority.
ID randomization: Karray et al. [13] proposed ID randomization method using randomization functions. The proposed method assigned space depending on the transmission period per IDs. Since the assigned space was fixed depending on the transmission period, attackers could identify the boundary of the space if they had enough time.
IDH-CAN: Wu et al. [14] proposed a hardware based ID hopping method. The proposed method randomized IDs by referencing to ID tables implemented in hardware and made reverse engineering difficult. Since ID tables were fixed, if attackers had enough time, CAN logs could be analyzed.
ID hopping with obfuscation: Ding et al. [15] proposed a method to simultaneously apply the ID obfuscation and the ID hopping. The proposed method made each vehicle using a different CAN database file via obfuscation and changed the IDs when transmission of messages through the ID hopping by referencing to ID tables. Since ID tables were fixed in a single vehicle, if attackers had enough time, CAN logs of the vehicle could be analyzed.
In this paper, we propose dynamic ID virtualization method to prevent existing analysis methods of the CAN log by virtualizing IDs each time messages are sent. Additionally, the proposed method renders the analysis performed in the previous session meaningless by changing the session periodically. Therefore, the proposed method imposes a time constraint on attackers.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
Through the several vulnerabilities of vehicles and wireless communications, attackers can access the unsecured CAN [4]- [6] . Since the CAN does not provide security functions, attackers can analyze transmitted messages and inject valid messages based on the analyzed information to cause vehicle malfunction. Therefore, the attack procedure is divided into two phases: preliminary and message injection. A detailed description follows.
A. PRELIMINARY PHASE
During this phase, attackers perform reverse engineering, referring to the method of creating a CAN database file based on useful information (e.g., ID of messages, message transmission period, encoding method of data field, physical data types including messages, and position of physical data at data fields) obtained by analyzing CAN logs. The information of messages is consistent for the same vehicle type and does not change. Attackers can obtain the CAN database file by analyzing the same vehicle type as the target vehicle in advance. The CAN database file created via reverse engineering is a prerequisite for attackers to generate valid messages for injection into the CAN bus. Therefore, attackers must obtain the information required to generate valid messages through this phase in order to inject valid messages.
B. MESSAGE INJECTION PHASE
During this phase, attackers inject messages into the CAN bus. Message injection attack are classified into three types. 1) Replay attack: attackers re-transmit messages sent on the CAN bus. A replay attack has the advantage of being easy to carry out because the attack only needs to identify the counter in the data field. The counter is inserted by software to detect invalid messages. Additionally, several messages do not have the counter in the data field, and, as such, a replay attack will virtually always be successful in this situation. 2) Message forgery attack: attackers generate valid messages based on the CAN database file and transmit them. The message forgery attack has a disadvantage, which is required accurate analysis for CAN logs during the preliminary phase. However, there is an advantage in that attackers can manipulate the data to desired values. 3) Bus off attack: attackers use the CAN error handling method to bring a target ECU into bus off mode. Attackers generate messages with a same ID as the ID of messages transmitted by the target ECU. Additionally, the message's data field has a smaller value than messages transmitted by the target ECU. Attackers send the message concurrently with the target ECU to incur the bit error. The TEC of the target ECU is increased by the bit error. Attackers repeatedly occur the error to make the target ECU into the bus off mode.
The bus off attack must analyze the transmission period of messages transmitted by the target ECU during the preliminary phase.
V. SYSTEM MODEL
The dynamic ID virtualization method allocates ranges for each fixed OID and transmits a message by changing the OID to VIDs randomly selected in the range. Additionally, a session is changed by updating tables at a predetermined period to make the analysis of the CAN log performed during the previous session pointless. Table 1 shows the main notation used in the proposed method.
A. OVERVIEW Fig. 4 . shows an overview of the proposed method. In the existing ECU structure, the original software sends and receives messages directly to/from the CAN bus. In the proposed method, the virtualization module places between the original software and the CAN bus. The module is responsible for sending and receiving messages.
1) COMPONENT
The virtualization module comprises two substitution tables, a virtualization controller, and a key. The description of each component follows. 1) There are two types of substitution tables in an ECU: a sender substitution table with information about OIDs that the ECU sends and a receiver substitution table with information about OIDs that the ECU receives.
The two substitution tables have the same structure. Substitution tables contain information about the OID, priority, range, VID, HV, error counter, and IHV. The range, VID, and IHV have two columns (_1, _2) per OID to pre-compute and store the values for use during the next session.
2) The virtualization controller uses information of substitution tables to change IDs of received messages to the corresponding IDs. In addition, the virtualization controller updates substitution tables after the message transmission or session change. Additionally, the virtualization controller recovers a session when synchronization fails. 3) In the proposed mechanism, all ECUs share a 256-bit master key. We assume that the key is stored in tamper-proof storage such as a secure hardware extension (SHE) [16] or a hardware security module (HSM) [17] like previous studies [6] - [9] . The key is used to initialize substitution tables in the session initialization phase.
2) MESSAGE PROCESS
Message process is divided into a sender-side and a receiverside. Through Message process, the original software sends and receives messages with the ID as OIDs. However, messages with the ID as VIDs are transmitted via the virtualization module in the CAN bus.
1) Sender-side Message Process
The sender-side ECU employs following process to transmit messages with an ID value as VID to the CAN bus.
• S1: The original software sends a message with the ID as OID to the virtualization module.
• S2: The virtualization controller finds the row with the same value as the ID of the received message in a OID column of the substitution table and extracts the corresponding VID.
• S3: The virtualization controller changes the ID of the message to the extracted VID and sends the message to the CAN bus.
• S4: The virtualization controller updates the extracted value of VID column in the substitution table with the new VID. For example, in Fig. 4 , the original software sends a message with the ID as 0x120. Then, the virtualization controller receives the message and finds the row with the value as 0x120 in the OID column. Next, the virtualization controller extracts 0x593 and changes the message's ID to 0x593. Finally, the virtualization controller transmits the message to the CAN bus and updates the used value (0x593) in the VID column on the substitution table.
2) Receiver-Side Message Process The receiver-side ECU carries out the following process for receiving messages which ID is VID.
• R1: The virtualization module receives a message with an ID value as VID from CAN bus.
• R2: The virtualization controller finds the row with the same value as the ID of the received message in a VID column of the substitution table and reads the corresponding OID.
• R3: The virtualization controller changes the ID of the received message to the corresponding OID and sends the message to the original software.
• R4: The virtualization controller updates the used value of the VID column in the substitution table with the new VID. For example, in Fig. 4 , the virtualization controller receives a message with the ID as 0x593. Then, the virtualization controller finds the row with the value as 0x593 in the VID column. Next, the virtualization controller reads 0x120 and changes the message's ID to 0x120. Finally, the virtualization controller transmits the message to the original software and updates the used value (0x593) in the VID column on the substitution table.
If the received VID does not exist on the substitution table during step R2, then step R3 and R4 are not performed. Instead, the virtualization controller checks whether the received VID is included in any range column. If the received VID is not included, the message is deemed unrelated to the ECU and ignored. Otherwise, the virtualization controller understands that a synchronization problem has occurred and increases the error counter corresponding to the range on the substitution table, as the received VID is included in the specific range but is invalid at the moment.
B. SESSION INITIALIZATION
When vehicles turn on, session initialization is performed via two steps. During the first step, all ECUs share a RN to be used as a seed. In the second step, substitution tables are initialized using the seed and the master key.
1) RANDOM NUMBER SHARING
During the random number sharing step, ECUs share a RN to be used as a seed when initializing substitution tables. If the RN is the same as before, the ranges and VIDs are assigned the same as before. In a forge attack, the attacker wants to complete the random number sharing by forging the RN as the desired value to predict VIDs and ranges. Since messages are not authenticated in the CAN environment, the attacker can easily forge messages. Therefore, we propose a random number sharing method that is secure against the forge attack in the CAN environment. We assume that each ECU has an ECU number in order from 1 and knows the total number of ECUs in the CAN bus. When the vehicle is turned on, each ECU transmit messages 16 times using the ID as its ECU number and the data field as the random value following the rules below.
1) The ECU changes the random value of the data field each time a message is sent. 2) The ECU only transmits messages after all ECUs with an ECU number less than its ECU number transmit messages 16 times. Each ECU adds the data fields for the 16 messages transmitted/received for each ECU number. Finally, each ECU divides the sum by 2 64 and sets the RN as the remainder. If an error occurs on the CAN bus during the random number sharing, the sender-side ECU lowers transmission count (16) by 1. Additionally, the other ECUs lower the reception count (16) for messages with the same ID as the ECU number of the sender-side ECU by 1. To prevent the forge attack, each ECU transmit messages 16 times. The security analysis of the proposed method is discussed in Section 7.
Algorithm 1 Range Division Algorithm
Input: RN, SK, SoW, ARS, PoR Output: RoW, IHVoW, SK, NRN 
for i ← 1 to SoW do 6 :
end for 9: Distribute(RIDS) 10: return RoW , IHVoW , SK , NRN 11: end procedure
2) SUBSTITUTION TABLE INITIALIZATION
In the initialization step of the substitution table, ranges and IHV are allocated to each OID through a range division algorithm. Additionally, a valid VID is selected through a virtualization ID selection algorithm. The table initialization step is performed two times to pre-compute values for range, VID, and IHV that will be used in the next session. A detailed explanation of the proposed algorithms is as follows.
• A range division algorithm divides the all ID spaces (2 11 ) into random sizes. Through the key, H, and RN, a range division algorithm distributes the range randomly each session. Therefore, attackers cannot accurately guess the ranges. Also, the algorithm updates SK and RN each session so that attackers cannot gain enough pairs to guess the fixed master key. Since VID is selected randomly within the range, there are two issues to consider when dividing the range.
-First, the range must be allocated evenly depending on the message transmission period. If the difference of the allocated RL is large for two neighboring IDs having the same transmission period, attackers can identify the boundary of the range using ID-specific counters.
-Second, the range must be assigned the random size. If the range is assigned to the fixed size, attackers can eventually discover the RL. For these two conflicting considerations, we use the ARS and the PoR.
-The ARS is calculated at the vehicle manufacturing stage to satisfy the first condition. The proposed method assigns weights to the OIDs according to their transmission period. The weights of each OID are the quotient of the value of the largest transmission period divided by its transmission period. For example, if the largest transmission period is 200ms, the weights of an OID with a 10ms period are 20. Then, ARS is the quotient of the value as 2 11 divided by the SoW, and presents the average RL for weight 1. Through the product of ARS and weights, the proposed method assigns uniform ranges to each OID according to their transmission period. -The PoR is used to satisfy the second condition, and signifies the percentage of randomness for ranges. Through PoR, the virtualization controller determines how much randomness is to be given when selecting ranges using a fixed ARS. For example, if the weights of the specific OID are 20, ARS is 10, and PoR is 0.5, the RL for the OID is a value between 100 (20 × (10 × (1 − 0.5))) and 300 (20×(10×(1+0.5)). The PoR is a static value and is predetermined in the vehicle manufacturing stage. As PoR increases, the RL varies but the session is required to update frequently. We perform experiments on various PoRs and analyze the results. In the proposed method, the ARS and PoR are both static values, and ranges are divided through Algorithm 1. The RIDS represents the residual ID space after random distribution. Distribute is a function that distributes the RIDS to the RoW evenly to use all ID space from 1 to 2 11 . If the RIDS remains less than the total index of the RoW, the RIDS is distributed by 1 from the smallest index of the RoW until it equals zero. Additionally, % is a mathematical operator that calculates the remainder. After execution of Algorithm 1, each ECU determines the range by distributing the RoW by weights in order of ID priority. For example, if a ID with the highest priority has weights as 3, the sum of RoW[1], RoW[2], RoW [3] are RL of the ID and the ID is allocated a range from 1 to the sum. The IHVoW corresponding to the first index value of RoW distributed to the ID is selected as the IHV. Each ECU stores the range and the IHV corresponding to the OID to be transmitted and received in substitution tables. During the initial execution, Algorithm 1 is performed with the seed and the master key as input values of the RN and SK respectively. Thus, we gain the SK, the RoW, IHVoW, and the NRN. From the next HV ← H (HV |OID, SK ) 3: RL ← Length(Range) 4: VID ← Min(Range) + (HV % RL) 5: return VID, HV 6: end procedure execution, the NRN and SK are used as input values of the RN and SK. • The virtualization controller selects one VID that currently valid by using the virtualization ID selection algorithm. The virtualization ID selection algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. Through the SK, H, and HV, a virtualization ID selection algorithm makes it impossible for attackers to predict the VID correctly. Length is a function that calculates the RL. Min is a function that obtains the minimum ID in the range. The | is a function that attaches two input values. The virtualization controller obtains the VID and HV from the algorithm with the SK, OID, range, and HV as input values. For the initial execution, the IHV is used as the input value of HV.
C. TABLE UPDATE
Tables are updated using the two given algorithms. Table update is divided into two cases. The first case is updating the VID and the HV using Algorithm 2 after sending or receiving messages. The second case is updating the range and the IHV using Algorithm 1 after the session change. If messages are sent more than a certain times in one session, attackers gain an opportunity to correctly estimate a boundary of the range by observing the number of transmissions per VID. For example, the RL allocated to two OIDs with a 10ms period is respectively 10 and 100, messages are transmitted by 100 and 10 times on average per VID within the ranges over 10 seconds. The attacker can identify the boundary of ranges through distribution of received VIDs. In the worst case scenario, when the average of the received VIDs in the range is greater than that in the neighboring range by 1, as shown Fig. 5 , attackers correctly estimate the boundary of the range. The minimum messages for attackers to estimate the boundary is expressed by the following equation.
where N and M are the number of messages transmitted within a certain range, p is the priority of the message, and f is a function that returns the RL corresponding to the OID with priority p. If the transmission period of the OID with priority p is denoted as A and the transmission period of the OID with priority p + 1 is denoted as B, the number of transmitted messages, N and M, is expressed with the following equation respecting to the elapsed time, T, of one session.
According to (1) and (2), the time required for attackers to correctly estimate the boundary of the range is expressed with the following equation.
Attackers must sniff the CAN bus for time T to satisfy the above expression during a session so that it becomes possible to correctly estimate the boundary between p and p + 1.
To prevent attackers from correctly inferring the boundary of any ID, we calculate the minimum value of T satisfying the above expression for all p and find the minimum value among them. This can be expressed by the following equation:
where P is a priority set. When the time exceeds the threshold, the proposed method updates the session by referencing another column which has already been pre-computed for the next session. However, not all nodes can accurately synchronize at the same time in the CAN environment. The proposed method stores p and min(T) when calculating Equation (4). Therefore, each ECU knows the priority corresponding to the min(T), which is the same value as the threshold. Each ECU calculates the number of transmitting/receiving messages with the priority in the threshold through Equation (2) . Since the session is updated based on the number of transmitting/receiving messages with the priority, each node can update the session at the same moment without time synchronization. As the session update method, the virtualization controller references another column which is pre-computed for the next session. Therefore, there is negligible delay. Then, the range, VID, and IHV, which are used for the next session, are pre-computed through Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 and subsequently stored in the used column. Because the threshold is different every time, depending on the RL, we analyze the threshold value per test cases described in Section 7.
D. SESSION RECOVERY
If synchronization between the message sender and receiver with a specific OID fails, the proposed method misses valid messages. Therefore, ECUs transmitting/receiving messages with the OID that failed to synchronize must re-synchronize via session recovery. The receiver-side ECU recognizes the synchronization problem through the error counter on the substitution table. If the receiver-side ECU recognizes the synchronization problem, the ECU sends a session recovery message. The ID of the recovery message is 0×000 and the data field is the IHV corresponding to the OID that brought about the synchronization problem. If the other ECUs receive the session recovery message, they determine whether or not the recovery message is relevant to themselves. If the data field of the recovery message is equal to the one of the values of the IHV column on the substitution table, the ECUs determine that the message is related to themselves and update the IHV using Equation (6) . In addition, the ECUs perform Algorithm 2 by using the changed IHV as HV. ECUs that performing session recovery then initialize the error counter corresponding to the IHV to zero. Through this process, the ECU transmitting/receiving the OID is re-synchronized to the same VID. In addition, attackers cannot make a valid session recovery message because attackers do not know the IHV.
where | is the concatenation operation joining two input values.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate the proposed method, we implemented a virtualization module on the board and conducted experiments on test cases.
A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
In this paper, Raspberry Pi 3 model B was used as an ECU. The experimental environment is shown in Fig. 6 . We connected three Raspberry Pis to one CAN bus and observe the messages sent to the bus using the CAN bus monitoring tool.
B. TEST CASE
To make the test environment similar to actual vehicles, we analyze the CAN log of actual vehicles (2014 KIA Soul, 2010 YF Sonata). As shown in Table 2 , the Soul has 45 IDs and uses a bus load of 54%, while the Sonata has 24. IDs with small transmission periods have a high influence on the bus load. Since the number of IDs with the smallest transmission period (10ms) is the same in both vehicles, the bus load of the Sonata is similar to the Soul. Among the CAN information of actual vehicles, we focused on the bus load for this study.
Since the bus load of test cases is higher than that of actual vehicles, the proposed method can accommodate the bus load higher than actual vehicles. We make test cases shown in Table 3 . Our three test cases set the total NumIDs as 25, 30, and 35 with 10ms period, which makes the bus load as 66%, 79.2%, and 92.4%, respectively. In addition, we performed threshold analysis on each test case, as the threshold depends on the bus load. 
VII. EVALUATION A. RANDOM NUMBER SHARING METHOD ANALYSIS
We implemented and analyzed the random number sharing method in this paper.
1) PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The number of messages required for the proposed method is the number of boards (B) × the number of messages transmitted by an ECU (16) . Because the time required for one message to be transmitted is about 0.23ms, the time required for message transmission for sharing the RN is B × 16 × 0.23ms.
2) SECURITY ANALYSIS
The random number sharing method must be able to defend from the forge attack. Since the attacker wants to open a session with the desired RN, DoS attacks which are concerned with high priority messages in the CAN bus, are not covered in this paper. There are three methods that the attacker can perform to forge a RN.
1) The attacker calculates the sum of the all transmitted random values before the last random value and makes a value which forges the RN to become a desired value. Then, the attacker transmits the value to the last random value. 2) For each ECU number, the attacker transmits 16 messages faster than conventional ECUs. 3) The attacker makes the sum of random values as zero by forcing an error for all transmitted messages during the random number sharing process. Conventional ECUs transmit 16 messages without delay. In the first attack method, it is impossible for an attacker to calculate the desired value when receiving messages with ID as the largest ECU number 15 times and transmit the value as the last random value faster than the 16 th message. In the second attack method, one or two messages can be transmitted faster than conventional ECUs depending on the performance of the attacker's ECU. However, it is impossible to transmit 16 messages faster than conventional ECUs because conventional ECUs try to transmit the random value. In the third attack method, the attacker forces errors to occur with the legitimate messages by transmitting the message with the same ID as legitimate messages simultaneously. We analyze that the proposed method is secure against the attacker who injects messages with the ID as the ECU number and the data field as zero. Security against the attacker is demonstrated in two steps in Fig. 7 .
In the first step, both the attacker and ECU A with the lowest ECU number are in error active mode. When the vehicle is turned on, ECU A and the attacker simultaneously transmit messages with the same ID as the message being sent by ECU A, the message of ECU A and that of the attacker collide, as shown in phase 1 of Fig. 7 . Since the data field of ECU A is larger than the attacker's message, the bit error occurs at ECU A. ECU A increases TEC by 8 and transmits an error frame of six consecutive dominant bits. Because of error frame of ECU A, the bit error occurs on the attacker's side, and the stuff error occurs in other ECUs. The attacker and other ECUs transmit an error frame of six consecutive dominant bits. The collision is repeated 16 times because of re-transmissions. The transmission/reception counts to the ECU number of the ECU A become 0. Therefore, the attacker succeeds in disturbing the transmission of the ECU A's random value. Additionally, both ECU A and the attacker enter into error passive mode after the 16 consecutive errors take place.
In the second step, the attacker performs the same attack as the first step on ECU B, which has an ECU number lower than all other except for ECU A. The message of ECU B and that of the attacker collide as in phase 2 of Fig. 7 , and the bit error is occurs in ECU B. ECU B increases the TEC by 8 and transmits an error frame of six consecutive dominant bits. Because of ECU B's error frame, the bit error occurs on the attacker's side, and the stuff error occurs in other ECUs. Unlike the first step, the attacker attempts to transmit six consecutive recessive bits as an error frame because the attacker is in error passive mode. Since the error frames (six consecutive dominant bits) of other nodes and that of the attacker are simultaneously transmitted, the error frame of the other nodes is transmitted to the CAN bus by the characteristics of the CAN bus. To re-transmit the error frame, the attacker waits for 6-bits. In the meantime, the message of ECU B is transmitted. As a result, the attacker fails the third attack method.
To disturb the message transmission of ECU B, the attacker needs another ECU with error active mode. To successfully use the third attack method, the attacker needs the same number of ECUs as the number of ECUs sharing the RN. To perform the attack, the attacker compromises a specific ECU that supports wireless communication or attaches an additional ECU to the CAN bus. Since many ECUs do not provide wireless communication functions, it is not realistic that the attacker connect ECUs as same number as the number of ECUs sharing a RN. Therefore, the proposed method is secure against three attack methods.
B. DELAY ANALYSIS
There are two types of additional delays in the proposed method: the transmission delay at the sender-side and the processing delay at the receiver-side.
• The transmission delay is the taken time to find the OID received from the original software in the substitution table and to change it to the corresponding VID.
• The processing delay is the taken time to check the validity of the received VID and, if valid, change it to the corresponding OID. Because the transmission delay and the processing delay perform the same comparison operation, they are calculated in the same manner depending on the row in the substitution table. The row in the substitution table increases according to NumID transmitted and received by one ECU. In this paper, we experimented on the delay that occurs according to the NumID. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 8 (a) . The horizontal axis represents the NumID transmitted and received by one ECU. The vertical axis represents the delay that occurs, and the unit is microsecond (µs). The NumID received by the specific ECU is not disclosed to the public. Thus, the precise delay of one ECU in an actual vehicle cannot be calculated. Since there are up to 45 OIDs in an actual vehicle, we analyze the delay by increasing the NumID received by one ECU from 10 to 50. Even in an environment where one ECU sends and receives 50 OIDs, the sum of the transmission delay and the processing delay does not exceed 40us on average. Therefore, the delay caused by using the proposed method is similar to noise that occurs in the transmission of an actual vehicle [18] , and is lower than that of previous studies [6] - [9] .
C. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
In the proposed method, ECUs must receive all messages on the CAN bus and process the messages in the software. In the receiver-side process, each ECU judges whether the received messages are relevant to its operation or not. The message filtering is a process that identifies unrelated messages and ignores these messages. Computational overhead of message filtering is the taken time to message filtering. To determine whether or not messages are unrelated, ECUs compare the VID of received messages with the values in the VID column on the substitution table. Therefore, the computational overhead of message filtering depends on rows in the substitution table. We analyzed computational overhead of message filtering by the NumID received by one ECU. The results of our analysis are shown in Fig. 8 (b) . The horizontal axis represents the NumID received by one ECU, while the vertical axis represents computational overhead of message filtering as shown in microseconds (µs). As the NumID increases, computational overhead increases. Even if NumID received by one ECU is similar to total NumID in the vehicles we analyzed, computational overhead remains smaller than 70µs on average.
D. THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
In this paper, we analyze the threshold needed for the session change while increasing the PoR by 10% from 10% to 50% at test cases. Fig. 9 . represents the threshold according to the PoR of each test cases. The threshold is the lowest value in test case 3 and the highest value in test case 1. In Fig. 9 (a) , which was the most like an actual vehicle's bus load among the three cases, it can be seen that the session should be changed after a lapse of 1.3 -1.6 seconds on average, according to the PoR. The threshold depends on the NumID and the PoR. As the NumID and PoR increase, the session should be changed to a shorter period.
E. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this paper, we analyze the security of the dynamic ID virtualization based on the existing attack procedure mentioned in the attack model.
1) PRELIMINARY PHASE
Reverse engineering during the preliminary phase collects CAN logs in the vehicle, classifies them by IDs, and analyzes the data field to create a CAN database file. With the proposed method, because IDs change every time a message is transmitted by the virtualization module, attackers cannot classify messages by OIDs. Additionally, the CAN database file created from reverse engineering can be reused at any time for vehicles of the same type in existing CAN. However, the proposed method prevents cross-use of the database file for vehicles of the same type through the unique key and makes the analysis of the CAN database file pointless via session change. Therefore, the proposed method is secure for existing reverse engineering methods.
2) MESSAGE INJECTION PHASE
The security analysis of the message injection phase is conducted for the three methods mentioned in the attack model.
• Through reverse engineering of the CAN log, attackers can recognize the counter inserted into the data field by the software. Therefore, the replay attack always succeed. Because the proposed method prevents reverse engineering, attackers cannot identify the position of the counter. Thus, the effect of the counter can be maximized. The attack success rate is lowered depending on both the RL and the size of the counter. If the RL is m, the success rate of replay attack is 1 m . Additionally, if the size of the counter is n-bit, the success rate of replay attack is 1 2 n because attackers do not know the position of the counter. Since the two events are independent, the success rate of the replay attack is 1 RL × 2 size of the counter . • The message forgery attack requires the CAN database file created via reverse engineering to generate valid messages. The proposed method prevents existing reverse engineering methods. Thus, attackers cannot generate valid messages.
• For the bus off attack, attackers must send messages with the same ID as messages sent by the target ECU at the same time to cause a collision. The collision must occur repeatedly to bring the target ECU into bus off mode. Even if attackers know the range, attackers randomly select the VID in the range to cause an error. The error occurrence rate of one message is 1 RL . Since the proposed method does not change hardware, message re-transmission maintains the same VID as before.
Through message re-transmission, the error is repeated until the target ECU is in error passive mode. However, if the target ECU is in error passive mode, message re-transmission does not cause an error [19] . To make the target ECU switch to bus off mode, the attackers must generate additional errors for 18 messages. Therefore, the attackers must generate a total of 19 consecutive errors. The success rate of the bus off attack becomes 1 RL 19 . In the actual vehicle, RL is approximately 100. Thus, in the proposed method, bus off attack is impossible.
F. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS
We compared existing ID changing methods to the proposed method. The method of this paper has advantages over other methods, as explained with the following perspectives.
• Security against reverse engineering: because IA-CAN fixes the upper bits of IDs, they do not prevent attackers from performing reverse engineering. Additionally, ID obfuscation cannot prevent a reverse engineering attack against a target vehicle because of its fixed IDs. ID hopping and CANORa are vulnerable to reverse engineering because IDs are fixed for a certain period and are easy to match with the previous IDs. In the case of IDH-CAN and ID hopping with obfuscation, IDs are changed every time the message is transmitted to provide security against reverse engineering. However, because the referencing table used to change IDs are fixed, attackers succeed reverse engineer by observing CAN logs for a sufficient time. Alternatively, our proposed method provides strong security against reverse engineering when compared to other methods because the proposed method changes IDs every time a message is sent and referencing tables update at the session change.
• Re-usability of analysis: when risk is assessed, the re-usability of an attack is an important factor [20] . From this perspective, ID obfuscation, CANORa, and ID hopping get a high score in the risk assessment, owing to the fixed ID. This means that once analyzed data can be used again for the same vehicle at any time. Likewise, in the case of IDH-CAN and ID hopping with obfuscation, if attackers succeed in making reference tables used to change IDs by analyzing the target vehicle, the attack can be re-use at any time. However, attackers cannot re-use the previously analyzed information in the proposed method, because tables are created differently each time from the seed that change every time the vehicle is turned on.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS A. ADDITIONAL REVERSE ENGINEERING METHOD 1) TIMING METHOD
In the CAN environment, the transmission period of messages is fixed. To infer ranges, the attacker may consider a method that classifies messages through the transmission period of messages. For example, if messages are sent at 12ms and 22ms, the attacker may infer one OID with a period of 10ms is virtualized as two messages, and the third message will be sent at 32ms. We demonstrate that this attack method is hard to carry out on actual vehicles. In actual vehicles, many messages are sent in a mass without delay as shown in Fig. 10 . In addition, messages with different transmission period from the period of a mass changes the order of messages in the given mass. For example, in the Fig. 10 , mass 2 with a period of 10ms has the pattern {0x316, 0x260, 0x18f, 0x080, 0x081, 0x2a0, 0x329, 0x440, 0x545}. However, in Fig. 11 , the transmission of the mass is delayed by the message (0x4b1), with a period of 20ms, and other reasons like jitter time. Additionally, messages in the mass are sorted by the delay. In this situation, the period of the message is not guaranteed. Actually, the transmission period has noise and does not maintain very precise timing [18] . Since the period of a message is not precisely maintained, it is difficult for the attacker to classify messages by transmission period.
2) DATA FIELD CORRELATION METHOD
In the CAN message of actual vehicles, specific areas of data fields have a fixed value or change seldomly. Since the proposed method considers only the ID, it may be vulnerable to attackers who analyze the data field. A solution to the problem is out of scope for this paper, but it is an important part of our future work. In this paper, we discuss the possibility of the data field protection in future work. We analyzed the actual vehicle's CAN log, which is composed of a total of 8,004,814 messages after one hour of observation. We analyzed messages in the CAN log. The messages have an 8-byte data field and are transmitted every 10ms. Fig. 12 .
shows the distribution of the dominant bit in the data field according to the ID. There are some differences depending on the ID. However, there are 35-50 dominant bits in the data field per one message on average. Also, the scope of dominant bits for one ID is mostly included in other IDs. If the distribution of the dominant bit is similar to Fig. 12 , we expect to prevent attackers who analyze the data field by applying simple permutation ciphers on the data field. Since the distribution of dominant bits is similar, the permutation ciphers of the data field will confuse attackers who find the correlation of the data field. Additionally, the data field of some messages is fixed to the dominant bit. It is expected that the distribution of the fixed dominant bits can be adjusted by simple modification during vehicle manufacturing (e.g., {0 : on, 1 : off } → {1 : on, 0 : off }). 
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a dynamic ID virtualization method which prevents attackers by changing the ID of messages, and we also implemented the virtualization module. Additionally, we proposed a random number sharing method required for ID virtualization and described the security of this method. In the analysis section, we compared the proposed method with existing ID changing methods. The proposed method renders previously performed analysis meaningless, and imposes time constraints to deter attackers who attempt reverse engineering. Future research plans are twofold: First, we will study how to reduce the delay, the computational overhead, and the time for calculating values in the substitution table through algorithm optimization. Second, we will study how to strengthen the security of the proposed method by re-arranging the bit order of the data field.
